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Abstract
Corruption has been described as a disease. When corruption infiltrates global health, it can be particularly
devastating, threatening hard gained improvements in human and economic development, international security,
and population health. Yet, the multifaceted and complex nature of global health corruption makes it extremely
difficult to tackle, despite its enormous costs, which have been estimated in the billions of dollars. In this forum
article, we asked anti-corruption experts to identify key priority areas that urgently need global attention in order to
advance the fight against global health corruption. The views shared by this multidisciplinary group of contributors
reveal several fundamental challenges and allow us to explore potential solutions to address the unique risks posed
by health-related corruption. Collectively, these perspectives also provide a roadmap that can be used in support of
global health anti-corruption efforts in the post-2015 development agenda.
Keywords: Global health, Corruption, Anti-corruption, Sustainable Development Goals, Good governance,
International development, Global health governance
Background
Tim Mackey (Fig. 1)
In 1996, former World Bank President James Wolfensohn
made a groundbreaking speech calling for international
action and attention to deal with what he coined the
‘cancer of corruption’ [1]. Decades later, this representation
of corruption as a destructive disease seems fitting, as
health-related corruption is now a multifaceted, multijur-
isdictional, and multibillion dollar phenomenon that
threatens the future progress of global health [2, 3].
Similar to cancer, health-related corruption comes in
several types (ranging from “petty” corruption such as
absenteeism of healthcare workers to “systematic”
corruption involving multinational companies engaged
in widespread healthcare fraud and abuse, and “grand”
corruption occurring at high levels of government), can
invade and spread (infiltrating public and private sectors
as well as poorer and richer countries alike), has an
enormous financial cost, is often difficult to detect/
diagnose and, most importantly, is hard to treat [2, 3].
Critically, health-related corruption is distinctly dangerous
compared to other forms of corruption in traditional eco-
nomic sectors such as energy, extractive industries, bank-
ing, and construction, in that it presents a “dual-burden”
of limiting both economic/human development while at
the same time endangering patients and population-level
health [2, 4].
The cost of health-related corruption can extend be-
yond the people and communities it directly impacts, as
the mere presence of corruption can lead to negative
public perception and criticism about the role of foreign
health aid [5]. This is evidenced by surveys conducted
by the Kaiser Family Foundation that have consistently
found that corruption and misuse of funds are seen as
the largest barrier to improving health in developing
countries among the US public (Fig. 2) [6]. Transparency
International (TI), an international non-governmental
organization created to combat corruption, has also
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explored perceptions of corruption in different public in-
stitutions, including in the medical and health sector.
Results from its 2013 Global Corruption Barometer
(GCB) [7] indicate that perceptions of the extent to
which the medical and health services sectors are
affected by corruption vary widely across different
countries (Fig. 3). Collectively, these negative views can
unjustifiably inflate public concerns about the effective-
ness of development assistance for health, leading to
lowered government commitment to health aid for de-
veloping countries that depend on these humanitarian
investments [5].
The motivation of different actors, including govern-
ment officials, private companies, and organized crime
groups to engage in health-related corruption should
come as no surprise: the healthcare sector is one of the
fastest and largest segments of the global economy,
accounting for nearly 10 % of the worldwide gross
domestic product (GDP) according to the World Bank
[8]. In addition, the health sector is characterized by
unique risk factors and inherent complexities particu-
larly susceptible to corruption, including information
asymmetry, the large number of actors and mix of public
and private sectors in healthcare systems, market uncer-
tainty, and large amounts of public spending [2–4].
These vulnerabilities allow the presence of various types
of corruption, spanning from bribery, kickbacks, and in-
formal payments to health personnel/administrators;
fraud and abuse involving payments for healthcare goods
and services that are not rendered; collusion and bid rig-
ging in healthcare procurement and contract awards;
biased or unfavorable decisions due to conflicts of inter-
est in healthcare transactions/relationships; corruption
in medical practice, education, and research; and diver-
sion, embezzlement and theft of various healthcare
resources [2–4, 9–12]. Further, the diversity and scope
of health-related corruption makes it equally difficult to
design programs effective in preventing, detecting, and
controlling corrupt practices [2].
The challenges of health-related corruption are further
accentuated in the context of global health programs
and settings. Specifically, global health programs are
transnational in nature, including participation of one or
more countries, and often involve substantial foreign aid
and multiple development partners. Additionally, many
global health programs operate in countries with weak
governance or rule of law [2, 13]. These factors can lead
to greater vulnerabilities for infiltration of corruption
that is multijurisdictional, impacted differently by the
varying policies, laws and regulations, and influenced by
local social and cultural beliefs about what constitutes
corrupt acts [2, 9]. There is also a great deal of money
at stake, with development assistance for health experi-
encing a rapid increase from a mere US$ 11 billion in
1999 to the US$ 36 billion disbursed in 2015, marking
the emergence of global health as a multibillion dollar
sector [14].
In an attempt to raise awareness to the unique chal-
lenges of global health corruption, this Forum article
presents views from a set of multidisciplinary experts
from fields including public health, political science,
economics, and international development. Our contrib-
utors comprise a mix of practitioners, implementers,
and researchers from civil society and global health
institutions, with experience working for organizations
directly engaged in anti-corruption programs such as the
World Bank, TI, and the UN Development Programme
(UNDP). The aim of this Forum is to bring together
these different perspectives to identify key priority areas
that urgently need attention and to lay out a roadmap
for global health anti-corruption efforts in the post-2015
development agenda.
Fig. 1 Tim K. Mackey is the Director of the Global Health Policy
Institute, an Assistant Professor at UC San Diego – School of Medicine,
and the Associate Director of the Joint Masters Degree Program in
Health Policy and Law at UCSD-California Western School of Law. He
has a multidisciplinary background and his research focuses on global
health policy, law, governance, and diplomacy and has worked or
consulted for organizations including the World Health Organization,
U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Department of Justice
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The following key themes relating to how to advance
anti-corruption goals emerged from our discussions:
1. Problems with the concept of “zero” corruption:
Corruption is endemic in all health systems,
including rich and poorer countries. However,
anti-corruption initiatives that aim for “zero”
tolerance of corruption may penalize programs that
are putting in place the building blocks for more
effective and corruption-resistant health systems.
Harsh penalties may create perverse incentives to
hide corruption, rather than rooting it out.
2. Better data: A pervasive theme among all
contributors was the admission that the true scope
and cost of global health corruption is largely
unknown. Corruption can be invisible, difficult to
detect, and often highly politicized, all of which
require better indicators, data collection/reporting,
and analysis.
3. Importance of transparency: Transparency is a
critical tool in curbing health corruption. This
includes enhancing transparency and disclosure in
financial systems and controls, healthcare
relationships/transactions, and health sector
procurement systems.
4. Multi-stakeholder partnership: Many actors,
including governments, private sector, and civil
society, have an interest in controlling corruption.
Thus, multi-stakeholder partnerships hold promise
as a strategy for advancing transparency and
accountability. Coalitions of local, national, regional,
and international stakeholders in both the public
and private sectors (including civil society) may help
to increase trust and gain the political support
needed to ensure that healthcare services and
projects are protected from corrupt practices.
5. Linkage to global health security: Combating
global health corruption is paramount to international
investments and shared goals to secure national and
global health security arising from the threat of
infectious disease outbreaks (such as the recent Ebola
outbreak) and other health emergencies.
6. Governance is important: “Good” governance
must encompass anti-corruption efforts, including
governance at the national level, governance of
global pharmaceutical supply chains, and governance
of the international development agenda. This is
particularly true with the new United Nation’s
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which, for
the first time, specifically address the themes of
Fig. 2 Public perception on the role of corruption in improving health in developing countries (Kaiser Family Foundation) [6]. Surveys conducted
by the Kaiser Family Foundation examining Americans’ opinions on the US role in global health have consistently found that the American public
views corruption as a major problem. In its 2015 survey, 44 % of respondents believed that ‘corruption and misuse of funds’ was the most important
reason why health cannot be improved in developing countries. Seventy-nine percent of respondents also believed corruption was a major barrier,
meaning that corruption is viewed by the American public as the biggest barrier (more than lack of infrastructure/resources, poverty, lack of political
leadership and effective programs, and lack of funding) to investing in programs that support global health goals
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corruption, ensuring access to healthcare services and
medicines, and encouraging global multi-stakeholder
partnerships as key strategic goals.
International attention concerning corruption has been
steadily growing, including a recent 2015 anti-corruption
summit hosted by former UK Prime Minister David
Cameron. Yet, insufficient attention has been focused on
the health sector and particularly on global health, despite
the fact that global health corruption represents a signifi-
cant barrier to the achievement of universal goals of pro-
moting human health, economic development, security,
and poverty alleviation.
In response, it is critical that the international commu-
nity develop a unified framework devoted to combating
global health corruption as the disease that it is. These
efforts should be underpinned by SDG 3 (“Ensure healthy
lives and promote well-being for all at all ages”, SDG 16
(sub-target 16.5, “Substantially reduce corruption and
bribery in all their forms”), and mobilized through robust
global multi-stakeholder partnerships as encouraged under
SDG 17 (“Strengthen the means of implementation and
revitalize the global partnership for sustainable develop-
ment”). Global partnership should look to leverage all anti-
corruption resources, programs, tools, law/policies, and
initiatives the international community has at its disposal.
Global efforts to address global health corruption could
be operationalized under a newly formed United Nations
High-level Panel on Corruption, convened by the Secretary
General, that would include in its programmatic objectives
a specific review of the impact of global health corruption
on human health, human rights, security, and international
development. The panel should include partnership with
key institutions that have been active in the fight against
health corruption. The proposed panel should deliver a set
of recommendations for concrete solutions, development
Fig. 3 Heat map of Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (GCB): perceptions of the extent of corruption in medical and
health services institutions. Transparency International’s 2013 GCB uses surveys from more than 114,000 respondents in 107 different countries to
assess people’s direct experiences and views on corruption in main institutions in their countries. This includes assessing perception of the extent
of corruption in Medical and Health Services institutions measured on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 indicates “not at all corrupt” and 5 indicates
“extremely corrupt.” The above map was generated using publicly available data from GCB and was visualized in ArcGIS map. It depicts the
varying levels of public perception on how corrupt medical and health institutions are within respective countries (global mean score of 3.3)
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of SDG indicators that specifically measure health-related
corruption, encourage anti-corruption policy coherence,
and establish a roadmap for achieving health systems that
are liberated from the chains of corruption.
Foreign aid, global health programs, and
corruption
William D. Savedoff (Fig. 4)
Corruption is a problem for health programs world-
wide, yet we know surprisingly little about its scale and
impact. Without this information, we do not know
whether anti-corruption strategies are doing too much
or too little, whether they are effective or weak, or
whether they improve program impact or get in the way.
Worldwide, foreign aid programs have been remark-
ably successful in improving health conditions, even in
extremely corrupt settings. Foreign aid has been essen-
tial to the eradication of smallpox, prevention of
vaccine-preventable diseases like measles, treatment of
potentially lethal conditions like diarrhea, and expanded
access to services that improve maternal and infant
health [15, 16]. This kind of success resonates with
taxpayers in wealthy countries who strongly support aid
for health programs; nevertheless, they worry about cor-
ruption. For example, 60 % of Americans think US
global health spending is “too little” or “just right”, but
44 % believe “corruption and misuse of funds” to be the
most important reason behind health aid ineffectiveness
(Fig. 2) [6].
Corruption certainly affects health aid, but it also af-
fects all health systems to some degree [3]. In richer
countries, corruption tends to make healthcare delivery
costlier, while in poorer countries, it tends to undermine
the delivery of care and exacerbate inequities. In low-
and middle-income countries, petty bribes and absentee-
ism are well documented, as are occasional cases of
high-level embezzlement and kickbacks. Experience
shows that foreign aid cannot solve these problems of
corruption without political commitment from the re-
ceiving countries [17, 18], but it can improve healthcare
delivery and population health even in very corrupt
contexts [19].
The primary approach used by donors to assure integ-
rity in their operations is to control how aid funds are
spent and monitored. Usually, recipients must establish
separate accounts, reporting systems, and bidding proce-
dures. Recipients may even have to obtain prior approval
from donors before issuing requests for proposals. This
has a positive side: following such procedures can im-
prove local capacity to receive, manage, and spend funds
appropriately. Nevertheless, financial controls can also
raise costs and encumber implementation. In 2010, more
than 90 % of USAID contracts went to US-based con-
sulting firms, in part because these firms could manage
the agency’s complex bidding and reporting require-
ments. At the World Bank, one study found that
contracting consultants took 17 months for programs
that only lasted about 2 years [20].
Aid agencies do need procedures to ensure integrity but
current approaches are unbalanced because they aim for
“zero” corruption without regard for results, namely the
impact on healthcare delivery and population health. For
example, Germany, Spain and Denmark suspended contri-
butions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria in 2011 after a media report exaggerated the
scale of corruption detected by the Fund’s own inspector
general’s office. To show they were tough on corruption,
donors halted funding without regard to the severity or
impact of their actions on program results. In doing so,
they also penalized the Global Fund for its efforts at integ-
rity and transparency [5]. In their zeal to root out corrup-
tion, investigators can also lose sight of what health
programs are trying to accomplish. In 2013, a report from
the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruc-
tion called for USAID to suspend a very successful health
Fig. 4 Bill Savedoff is a senior fellow at the Center for Global
Development (CGD), where he works on issues of health policy,
performance payments, and corruption. Before joining CGD, he
worked at the Inter-American Development Bank and the World
Health Organization on projects and research in Latin America, Africa
and Asia. His publications include The Health Financing Transition,
Governing Mandatory Health Insurance, and Diagnosis Corruption
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program because they found inadequate accounting sys-
tems within the Afghan Ministry of Health. The report
not only lacked specific evidence of fraud; it also failed to
consider how a program at risk for corruption could have
contributed so much to increases in healthcare delivery
and reductions in child mortality [5].
Ignoring information about program results when fight-
ing corruption endangers progress. Simultaneously, it
neglects a powerful tool for detecting fraud and improving
anti-corruption strategies. If agencies did a better job of
measuring results, they could use this information to
prioritize how they allocate anti-corruption resources.
They could also use such information to learn how anti-
corruption strategies affect project success so as to make
them more effective and less intrusive. Finally, results
measurements can help aid agencies to distance them-
selves from subjective and arbitrary judgments about the
trustworthiness of partner governments and about sus-
pending aid.
Global health programs are well worth the money.
The world should invest more in expanding access to
healthcare, disease prevention, and global public goods
like epidemiological surveillance and advance prepar-
ation for outbreaks of epidemics like SARS, highly
pathogenic influenza, Ebola, and Zika. Fortunately, glo-
bal health programs succeed despite corruption in many
contexts. Aid should continue to support health pro-
grams but with greater attention to measuring results as
a way to highlight when corruption is an obstacle and to
acknowledge when it is not.
Economics, health systems, and corruption
Maureen Lewis (Fig. 5)
Healthcare systems underpin both healthcare delivery
and efforts towards attaining universal healthcare (UHC),
the global goal for public health organizations such as the
World Health Organization (WHO). Any push to attain
UHC can founder on shifting sand. Infectious diseases like
malaria and HIV dominate the donor and private
foundation landscape in developing countries, but chronic
conditions, including cancer, cardiovascular disease, dia-
betes and accidents, are eclipsing communicable diseases
as causes of morbidity and mortality across the globe. On
the one hand, this shift represents a remarkable achieve-
ment in controlling infectious diseases, on the other,
prevention and treatment of chronic diseases imply man-
agement of more complex morbidities and more compli-
cated services.
The performance of healthcare systems determines the
effectiveness and costs of healthcare services. Corruption
is a significant cost driver and a cancer in undermining
effective healthcare services. The Ebola outbreak, for ex-
ample, stemmed from weakened public health systems
suffering from decades of weak institutions and conflict
making conditions susceptible to corruption and mis-
trust [21]. As demonstrated in heavily impacted coun-
tries of Liberia and Sierra Leone, failures in patient
diagnosis and treatment can reflect problems in health
system functioning, specifically its clinical, non-clinical,
and management tasks. Economists worry about the
costs and effectiveness of services – is there too much
or too little care being provided, are services organized
and delivered efficiently, are resources used most effect-
ively to meet needs, and is performance where it should
be? Effective health systems explicitly and implicitly in-
tend to address many of these concerns because they
bolster access and performance of clinical services.
Over the past two decades, the honesty and integrity
of healthcare systems across low- and middle-income
countries has troubled citizens, external and internal ob-
servers, and governments alike. Coming from a broader
agenda of corruption and development that linked poor
services and slow growth to widespread corruption [22],
Fig. 5 Maureen Lewis is the co-founder and CEO of Aceso Global, a
non-profit organization that strengthens health systems in emerging
markets and developing countries by improving hospital management
and integrated care, quality, and performance. She is a non-resident
Fellow at the Center for Global Development and a Visiting Professor
at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Prior to that,
Dr. Lewis spent 22 years at the World Bank in management and staff
positions, most notably as Chief Economist Human Development.
Dr. Lewis was a Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Development
and was previously a Senior Research Associate at The Urban Institute
working in Latin America
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the health sector has had to confront corruption in
healthcare systems. Initially, researchers and policy-
makers implicitly assumed that corruption was not a
problem in the health sector, and organizations like the
World Bank determined that investments in health and
education were the preferred options in corrupt societies
as they implicitly believed these sectors were immune.
That assumption no longer holds and evidence bears
this out.
Corruption can be defined in abbreviated terms as ‘use
of public office for private gain’ [23]. However, what has
led to corruption in healthcare? Fundamentally, a lack of
accountability. This lack of accountability derives from a
number of factors, including inadequate management,
lack of oversight, poor training, and an absence of per-
formance incentives, which in turn make accountability
impossible [24]. Accountability is fundamental as it re-
quires that “officials are called to account and to answer
for responsibilities and conduct” [25], that is, it ensures
consequences for poor behavior and ideally rewards
exceptional behavior. Because accountability in most
healthcare systems is diffused across patients, payers,
managers, and citizens, there is effectively little if any ac-
countability to anyone. Without accountability, public
servants face few restraints. Common measures of cor-
ruption in healthcare across low- and middle-income
countries include absenteeism of physicians and nurses
(a practice rife in much of the world), health workers,
including physicians, forced to purchase their public sec-
tor jobs, ghost workers, frequent “stock outs” of drugs
and supplies, leakages of public monies, patients paying
“under the table” directly to individual providers, and a
perception of healthcare as among the most corrupt sec-
tors in many countries [9, 24]. Such practices and cir-
cumstances compromise the delivery of healthcare.
The leap to how corruption undermines healthcare
systems should be obvious. Without personnel, drugs,
management, and other inputs, healthcare services are
effectively unavailable. For economists, this scenario
translates into total system breakdown because resources
are being wasted, performance is poor, outputs are com-
promised, and expected outcomes remain well out of
reach. Indeed, corruption introduces serious complica-
tions as it undermines every aspect of healthcare
delivery from the effectiveness of providers to the
availability of inputs for the care of patients [3]. A move
to address any breakdown in healthcare entails efforts
on multiple fronts.
Numerous public initiatives have attempted to mitigate
the observed consequences of corruption. A sampling of
these include reducing costs by bulk purchasing of sup-
plies and drugs, and public hiring and management of
personnel in order to keep human resources “in-house”
[24]. These initiatives reflect efforts to internally manage
and control healthcare delivery to safeguard basic stan-
dards and improve quality. However, these efforts may
have had the opposite effect. They have served to fuel
corruption and erode quality precisely because institu-
tions, managers, and employees are not held accountable
by the public healthcare system.
Absent from much of the healthcare agenda is an
acknowledgment of any perverse implicit or explicit
incentives that allow for poor behavior. Economists rely
on incentives to encourage good performance through,
for example, merit promotions or bonuses for good
performance, or to discourage unethical or illegal be-
havior such as stealing of drugs, absenteeism or financial
mismanagement through sanctions, demotions or firing.
However, these incentives remain rare in public systems
even when egregious performance is documented. Des-
pite the common absence of incentives, well-designed
explicit incentives with clear accountabilities remain fun-
damental to well performing healthcare systems. Evi-
dence increasingly points to separating the payer and
provider to allow oversight by a different entity, and to
contracting out services spanning clinical care to facility
maintenance to private or publicly accountable entities
[24].
Healthcare is among the most complex sectors in any
economy. Raising the bar and improving how these sys-
tems work will hinge on clear incentives and effective
accountability that roots out the various forms of
corruption that have infiltrated the health system of this
trillion-dollar global sector. Without that synergy, clini-
cians, citizens, and economists will never be satisfied,
nor should they be, with healthcare locally and globally.
Civil society fights corruption in healthcare
Frank Vogl (Fig. 6)
Concerns about the failure of a large number of well-
intentioned official foreign aid programs and projects in
the healthcare sector were one of the powerful drivers
behind the establishment of TI in 1993. TI was the first
global non-governmental organization dedicated ex-
clusively to anti-corruption, and it currently operates
through national chapters in more than 100 countries.
Today, many civil society organizations are planning
and implementing anti-corruption projects to specifically
improve healthcare services, notably for the poor in poor
countries. The scale of the challenge is enormous; for
example, TI’s 2016 survey for nine countries in the
Middle East and North Africa showed that 20 % of citi-
zens paid bribes to receive health services, with the rate
at 38 % in Morocco [26]. The GCB for sub-Saharan Af-
rica found that 12 % of citizens routinely paid bribes for
health services, and in many cases they paid multiple
bribes, notably when needing hospital services [27].
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An important challenge is to find ways to obtain first-
hand reports from citizens on the corruption that they
encounter in healthcare services and to bring this to the
attention of public officials. Over the last couple of years,
the Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF), an inde-
pendent organization originally started in 2000 by the
founders of TI, has been pioneering a new information and
communications technology (ICT) approach in Uganda. Its
likely success can lead to similar projects in other
countries. Namely, PTF, together with the Anti-Corruption
Coalition Uganda, launched the Citizen Action Platform
(CAP) [28] to deploy ICT to systematically record, aggre-
gate, map, and track cases of corruption through to their
resolution. The aim has been to provide citizens with a
means to safely and anonymously report abuse from their
mobile phone and receive feedback. The ICT approach has
dramatically reduced the costs of monitoring and reporting
public service failures, which provides civil society organi-
zations with sufficient solid data to constructively engage
with service providers through a better understanding of
where, when, and what issues citizens are most concerned
about. The CAP program gained traction after instituting a
partnership with UNICEF’s Ureport program in January
2016, and may serve as a model in developing more ac-
countable and transparent means of providing healthcare
services and distributing medicine and medical supplies.
While the reports received often relate to waste and ineffi-
ciency in services, more than 25 % of all complaints under
the CAP program included bribe taking.
PTF has been involved in engaging citizens against cor-
ruption on many fronts in more than 50 countries
through specific projects. Experience from PTF projects in
the health sector where, in many cases, demands for
bribes by officials and healthcare workers undermined ser-
vice delivery has yielded valuable lessons. PTF has shared
these findings widely [29, 30] and they have, for example,
influenced some of its most recent work, such as the CAP
program. Accordingly, PTF has found, for example, that
key approaches in implementing citizen-led projects in
the health sector where waste of resources, inefficiency
and corruption are commonplace, include:
 Raising public awareness of rights, particularly the
costs of medicines and treatments, is a key first-step
to ensuring these rights are appropriately fulfilled.
 Designing projects to cover a wide range of issues so
that they are capable of hearing a wide variety of
citizen voices and responding to their greatest
concerns – this proved to be most effective, for
example, in PTF’s work with 15 communities in
service delivery projects in India.
 Engaging constructively with authorities is the most
effective way to resolve issues and achieve change.
 Advocacy is more powerful with partnerships
between civil society organizations at the national
level, who have access to decision-makers, and the
local level, who can ensure that service delivery is
supported by systemic or policy changes.
 Trained and supported volunteer citizen committees
can be powerful agents to identify corruption and
push for improvements, even on technical issues.
 Anti-corruption commissions and public service
codes of conduct can be helpful in elevating
corruption issues and strengthening accountability
among service providers.
Tragically, progress in improving healthcare delivery
in many countries suffers not only from the corruption
that PTF and its partners have been addressing
community-by-community, but also because of grand
corruption – the wholesale theft of health budgets by
senior government officials and politicians. At the level
of grand corruption there is no meaningful way to single
out the impact on healthcare relative to overall eco-
nomic development and the provision of basic services
to all citizens to reduce poverty. The scale of this
problem is well highlighted by the African Progress
Panel Report 2013 [31], which concluded that grand cor-
ruption was the prime cause of the extraordinary pov-
erty in many of the natural resource-rich countries of
sub-Saharan Africa – core health data for Nigeria and
Angola, for example, are atrocious, especially when the
oil wealth of these countries is considered.
For TI, the specific efforts made by many of its national
chapters to implement healthcare projects, plus the thou-
sands of complaints they seek to handle from individual
Fig. 6 Frank Vogl is a co-founder of Transparency International and
the Partnership for Transparency Fund and serves as an advisor to both
organizations. He is an adjunct professor of government at Georgetown
University. Frank is the author of Waging War on Corruption – Inside
The Movement Fighting The Abuse of Power (new paperback edition,
September 2016) updated, 2016) Rowman & Littlefield. He writes and
lectures extensively on corruption – www.frankvogl.com
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citizens who bring forward personal cases of corruption,
go hand-in-hand with a global “No Impunity” strategy.
We believe that far more effort must be made by the
international community to ensure that top government
officials and politicians, as well as the business people they
conspire with, no longer operate as if they are above
the law.
Emerging tools and health system interventions
to prevent corruption – a role for open
contracting
James Sale (Fig. 7)
Of the trillions of dollars spent on healthcare globally
on an annual basis [32], a large proportion is spent
through large public contracting for medicines, equip-
ment, and health facility construction. However, esti-
mates suggest that 10–25 % of global spending on public
procurement is lost to corruption and waste [3]. It is
therefore germane to look at procurement when consid-
ering emerging health sector-wide anti-corruption tools.
Health sector procurement is particularly vulnerable
to corruption due to its technical complexity, numerous
stages, and requirement of high expertise. It is univer-
sally accepted that a fundamental practice for curbing
corruption in public procurement is increasing transpar-
ency. This is nothing new; however, what is new is the
growing use of open contracting as a pragmatic remedy
to a lack of transparency as part of the wider move
towards open governments. Open contracting is the
practice of publishing and using open and accessible in-
formation from key stages of the procurement process.
In health systems, this can begin with publishing needs
assessments and continue through to quality assurance
and contract completion [33]. This information is only
useful if easily applied to identify potential issues and
hold procurement agents accountable. To achieve this,
data needs to be publically accessible according to mea-
sures such as the Open Contracting Data Standards, so
that external oversight can be properly carried out [34].
At the 2016 Anti-Corruption Summit in London, open
contracting in public procurement gained substantial sup-
port with a commitment in the Summit Communique to
‘making public procurement open by default – so that
citizens and businesses can have a clear public record of
how public money is spent’ [35]. Furthermore, four coun-
tries (Argentina, Malta, Mexico, and Nigeria), supported
by a UN commitment to work with ‘global, regional and
country initiatives that strengthen the transparent procure-
ment of health commodities’, committed to progressing
open contracting standards in their health sectors [36].
These pioneering countries are backed by a genuine appe-
tite for reforming health sector procurement in many
more countries. To encourage more to follow this lead,
the added benefits of reducing procurement corruption
through increased transparency need to be demonstrated.
For example, disclosing adequate levels of data and infor-
mation can produce greater purchasing power for govern-
ments through the knowledge of what others are paying,
allowing them to achieve better value for money and re-
ducing the risk of price gouging, price manipulation, and
overpayments [4].
In 2014, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians died
due to a lack of essential life-sustaining medicines,
affecting those suffering from tuberculosis, viral hepa-
titis, hemophilia, and orphan diseases [37]. One major
contributing factor was the failure of the public medi-
cines procurement system, which the Ukrainian govern-
ment itself called ‘inefficient, corrupted, non-transparent’
[38]. In response, the Ukrainian Ministry of Health out-
sourced the procurement of drugs to two UN agencies
(UNDP and UNICEF) and Crown Agents, a British so-
cial enterprise working in international development.
The organizations reformed the system to meet inter-
national standards and have already reported large sav-
ings and increased flow of medicines to patients. UNDP
reported US$ 1 million of savings in anti-tuberculosis
medicines this year alone, and Crown Agents were able
to procure oncology medicines at prices 45 % cheaper
than the Ministry of Health paid in 2014, saving nearly
US$ 20 million [39, 40].
In addition to the basic reform of medicines pro-
curement, Ukraine has successfully launched the e-
procurement platform ProZorro [41]. Formed by a
Fig. 7 James Sale is the Program Manager for Transparency
International’s Pharmaceuticals & Healthcare Program. He joined
TI in 2014 to establish the Pharmaceuticals & Healthcare Program
having previously worked in governance and public financial
management at Crown Agents and vaccine surveillance with the
World Health Organization
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public-private partnership including TI Ukraine, the sys-
tem is based on the Open Contracting Data Standards
and has won international awards. Already having proc-
essed some health sector contracts and demonstrated
savings, ProZorro will be mandatory for all public pro-
curement as of August 2016. As with any new system,
there will undoubtedly be improvements that need to be
made; however, it is an extraordinary accomplishment to
create such a system in the context of political and
security instability. This sets a precedent for others.
While national governments are seen as the key
drivers for improving procurement systems, those acting
at a regional and global level are equally crucial for
progress. These key actors need to not only lead by
example, but must also have the resources to invest in
innovative solutions and wider adoption. One such
innovative approach is currently being launched by the
Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
(The Global Fund).
Wambo.org is an e-procurement platform that acts as
an e-marketplace for Principle Recipients of Global Fund
grants to purchase quality-assured goods launched in
2016 [42]. The system pools orders and, by combining
the purchasing power of governments, aims to keep
costs low and consistent. Wambo.org is also set to roll
out beyond just Global Fund grantees, including non-
for-profit organizations, with The Global Fund project-
ing savings of at least US$ 250 million over the next
4 years. Wambo.org is an online procurement system
that provides information on products, prices, delivery
times, and tracking [43], much like an online shop.
While principally acting as an e-marketplace, systems
such as Wambo.org can also record the type of data that
is needed for external oversight and accountability.
When adequate public procurement data is disclosed in
a usable format, civil society is able to scrutinize and
identify corruption risks. Data collected through such
e-procurement processes should be publically disclosed
and accessible for further study.
Despite these types of examples, current anti-corruption
tools and interventions are still limited, and there is an
absence of key actors committed to preventing corruption
from occurring in health systems. Corruption remains rife
and immediate action is required in order to coordinate a
holistic and multi-stakeholder approach. Until such ac-
tion, progressive tools will have little impact and success
will occur in isolation.
Why making the invisible visible matters for
global access to medicines
Jillian Clare Kohler (Fig. 8)
Uneven access to pharmaceuticals continues to be a
serious global health challenge despite targeted invest-
ments by the development community in programming
and services. As one illuminating example, 22 million
people living with HIV remain without access to anti-
retroviral therapy despite rapid scale-up and increased
availability of generic products [44]. We know that im-
proved access to medicines (and vaccines) could save as
many as 10 million lives per year [45]. Why then do we
have persistent disparities in access to medicines? Much
of the development policy conversation on, and inter-
ventions designed to address, medicine barriers have
focused traditionally on infrastructural limits to service
delivery and the impact of intellectual property; yet,
there is an increasing body of evidence that illuminates
how governance challenges may create opportunities for
corruption and result in additional barriers to access to
medicines [46, 47].
Further complicating issues is the inherent complexity
of the pharmaceutical system, which encompasses the
actions of public and private stakeholders as they move
drugs through the global supply chain from purchasing
to delivery to patients. The system is inherently
challenging to govern, as it is characterized by multiple
Fig. 8 Jillian Clare Kohler is a Professor at the Leslie Dan Faculty of
Pharmacy, the Dalla Lana School of Public Health and the Munk School
of Global Affairs. She is also Director of the WHO Collaborating Centre
for Governance, Transparency and Accountability in the Pharmaceutical
Sector. Her research and teaching are focused on global pharmaceutical
policies related to improving fair access of those in need to critical
medicines. Prior to joining the University of Toronto, she worked
exclusively on global pharmaceutical policy for a number of UN
organizations, including UNICEF, the World Bank and the WHO.
She continues to advise global institutions and NGOs on global
pharmaceutical policy issues such as anti-corruption strategies,
drug regulations, and reimbursement policies
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opportunities for system failure, limited accountability
between stakeholders, and a lack of coordination
between the various stakeholders [48]. There are indeed
multiple information gaps at all levels, including
between the consumer and the healthcare provider
(in terms of prescription drug choice), between the
healthcare provider and the manufacturer (in terms of the
therapeutic qualities of the product), and even between
the manufacturer and the regulator. The pharmaceutical
system’s vulnerabilities to corruption are many and in-
creasingly understood as a pervasive problem with nega-
tive effects on health status and social welfare [9].
Corruption in the pharmaceutical system specifically
can compel the global poor, who are the most vulnerable
to its worst effects, to make sub-optimal choices that
may include purchasing drugs from unqualified or illegal
drug sellers to save money, not taking needed medicines
if they are unavailable in the public health system, or
impoverishing themselves further by having to purchase
expensive drugs in the private health system. Further, the
transnational criminal trade in substandard/spurious/
falsely-labeled/falsified/counterfeit medical products is a
pervasive problem in global markets, and is recognized as
a global public health threat with severe consequences,
including patient death, treatment failure, and possible
antimicrobial resistance [49]. Thus, pharmaceutical gov-
ernance, with a focus on anti-corruption activities, is
essential to improve healthcare services and patient out-
comes globally.
For decades, global development institutions ignored ad-
dressing corruption in their policy and programmatic
areas. There are many reasons why this was the case – it is
challenging to provide substantial data about its occur-
rence and its impacts, and it is a highly sensitive and polit-
ically charged issue. Thanks to growing public awareness
about the deleterious impacts of corruption, particularly in
terms of development goals, addressing corruption is now
squarely embedded in the global development agenda and
it is even included as a specific target within the new SDGs.
However, even before these developments, global organiza-
tions, donor funded organizations, and civil society, such
as the WHO, the Medicines Transparency Alliance, the
Global Fund for AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, and
most recently, TI, have been active in this area by launch-
ing policy and/or operational work on transparency and
accountability, two key components of good governance in
pharmaceutical systems.
The integrity of the global pharmaceutical supply chain
is indispensable to securing health outcomes today and to-
morrow [46]. However, as stated above, governance mat-
ters. For example, to avoid breaches in the pharmaceutical
procurement system, an area particularly vulnerable to cor-
ruption, e-procurement should be the norm. Electronic
bidding creates a platform through which multiple
healthcare facilities can upload their tenders and where
prequalified suppliers that have a proven reliability can par-
ticipate. Open contracting, along with e-procurement, can
help improve transparency and accountability in the pro-
curement process and ideally lead to financial savings as
well as more assurance that good quality medicines are be-
ing procured [50]. Making the invisible visible and ensur-
ing that mechanisms for good governance that promote
transparency and accountability are in place, not just in
procurement but in all areas of the pharmaceutical system,
are important for improving global pharmaceutical access
to good quality and essential medicines and to achieve
health gains.
Health security and corruption
Joshua Michaud (Fig. 9)
We live in an age of epidemics and potential pan-
demics. One need only list some of the key threats from
the headlines of the last few years alone to get a sense –
Zika, Ebola, MERS, influenza, and rising antimicrobial
resistance. Above and beyond the morbidity and mor-
tality they cause, these events often carry huge economic
and social disruption costs, and therefore are increas-
ingly seen not just as public health problems, but also as
national and global security concerns [51].
Fig. 9 Joshua Michaud is an Associate Director for Global Health
Policy at the Kaiser Family Foundation, and an authority on global
health policy issues such as financing, the role of US agencies in
global health, global health diplomacy, and health security and
emerging diseases. He is also a Professorial Lecturer at the Johns
Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
in Washington DC, where he teaches courses on global health
policy and health and development
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Health security efforts, which have received greater at-
tention and funding from policymakers in the last sev-
eral years, seek to minimize vulnerability to these types
of threats. While the increased attention is welcome, all
parties must recognize that such efforts are vulnerable
to corruption just as with other areas of healthcare. As
previously discussed, corruption can take many forms:
from “petty” corruption such as absenteeism or bribe-
taking, to criminal activity such as theft and embezzle-
ment of funds, to poor governance and lack of
compliance with rules and regulations abetted by nepo-
tism and non-merit-based hiring practices [52]. Corrupt
practices not only impact individual patients and
localities where they occur, but in the case of emerging
diseases, they can potentially have more widespread,
even global, consequences for human health and
welfare.
As outlined in the newly launched Global Health
Security Agenda (GHSA), the aim of health security ef-
forts is to help countries build a set of core capabilities
to prevent, detect, and respond to emerging health cri-
ses. However, even if GHSA documents do not mention
corruption specifically, these capacity building efforts are
vulnerable just like any other public health initiatives.
The remainder of this section will briefly discuss exam-
ples of corruption that can jeopardize capabilities in
each of the three focus areas of the GHSA.
Prevent
Preventing an outbreak from occurring in the first place
is the best possible health security outcome, but requires
an effective public health system with good governance
and oversight being in place. Unfortunately, many
healthcare systems struggle with providing access and
high quality services, often due to a variety of corrupt
practices [53–55]. Efforts to stem the spread of anti-
microbial resistance – one of the key GHSA areas of
prevention effort – are jeopardized by the infiltration of
poor quality, falsified, substandard, and counterfeit med-
icines, including antimalarials and antibiotics, into
pharmaceutical supply chains [46, 47, 56].
Health security also requires empowered, effective
leadership and oversight, but the system of global health
governance has been weakened by placements in key po-
sitions based on politics and personal connections rather
than expertise or effectiveness. As an example, WHO
country representatives in West Africa at the time of the
2014 Ebola outbreak were “politically motivated appoint-
ments” whose actions were viewed as ineffective, and
even a hindrance, during the early response to the dis-
ease [57–59]. Corruption reportedly plagues the selec-
tion of member state delegations and the process of
electing WHO leadership [60]. We are at an important
juncture in this regard, as member states have already
begun negotiations for selecting the next Director
General of the WHO, a process that has been character-
ized as far from open and transparent.
Detect
Early detection of emerging disease events is critical for
intervening quickly to stem impacts, and detection relies
on robust surveillance systems with a motivated and ef-
fective workforce at its foundation. Astute observation
by local health practitioners is often the first step in
early detection of an outbreak. It is unfortunate, then,
that many communities often lack trust in their local
health providers due to corrupt practices such as re-
quirements to pay bribes for services even when nomin-
ally free and high rates of chronic absenteeism among
health workers. This was certainly a factor in the Ebola
epidemic; in 2013, 48 % of patients in Sierra Leone and
40 % in Liberia reported paying bribes to access health
services [7] and mistrust between local communities and
primary public healthcare providers in Sierra Leone pre-
existed the outbreak [61, 62].
Even after an outbreak is detected, reporting by
authorities can be incomplete or delayed due to self-
interest and skewed incentives. The SARS episode in
China provides an example where ability to intervene
early was undermined by conscious misrepresentation of
information in order to protect individuals’ careers and
the government’s reputation [63]. Similar behavior has
been noted in Saudi Arabia and South Korea regarding
MERS, and in Venezuela regarding Zika [64–66].
Utilizing a broader, more decentralized, and technology-
driven approach to surveillance can help address some of
these challenges. For example, linking mobile phone disease
reporting from civil society and private sector sources to
formal networks can democratize surveillance and loosen
central authorities’ tight control over critical outbreak infor-
mation [67]. Robust platforms already exist for this more
informal, non-centralized type of reporting, though not
without their own challenges [68, 69]. This has already oc-
curred to a limited extent at the global level, as the most re-
cent revision of international regulations around disease
reporting allow WHO, for the first time, access to and use
of information from non-governmental sources for the pur-
poses of identifying outbreaks of concern [70].
Respond
Epidemic response can involve many actors and new funds
pouring in, sometimes without adequate oversight and
controls being in place. Injecting funds into weak systems
not ready to absorb them or track them can be a recipe for
crimes of opportunity like embezzlement and diversion of
resources for private gain, as emergency responses in coun-
tries of all income levels have demonstrated [71–73]. In
the case of Ebola, Sierra Leone’s auditor-general found that
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one-third of the country’s own contributions to the re-
sponse within its borders was unaccounted for [74], while
Liberia’s General Auditing Commission found numerous
financial and reporting irregularities in Ebola response
money in the country [75]. Further, Saudi Arabia’s govern-
ment reported US$ 266 million of its funding for MERS to
have been used in a corrupt manner [76].
To combat such diversion of funds there is no substitute
for vigilance and having robust, risk-based approaches in
place prior to the occurrence of an outbreak. This means
having policies, procedures and the means to provide due
diligence for recipients of funds, plus proper documenta-
tion, reporting, monitoring, and oversight of funding.
Finally, transparency on aid flows, covering public and pri-
vate actors, can help provide more accountability during
an outbreak [77].
These are only a few examples of how corruption can
impact health security, and what can be done to address
it. The only way to truly and sustainably address emer-
ging threats is to ensure all corners of the globe have a
minimum level of public health capacity, and a function-
ing system of governance is a key part of this goal that is
not always emphasized. Through the GHSA and other
initiatives, efforts are now underway to bolster public
health capabilities; however, accountability and oversight
mechanisms to combat corruption should be considered,
as these will ultimately help make funds go even farther
and save even more lives.
Anti-corruption and the SDGs – a pathway
forward
Taryn Vian (Fig. 10)
Building on the momentum created by the Millennium
Development Goals, the SDGs have set an agenda to
eradicate poverty, promote peace, protect the environ-
ment, and advance population well-being over the next
15 years [78]. SDG 3 (“Ensure healthy lives and promote
well-being for all at all ages”) includes targets to reduce
mortality, end epidemics, manage non-communicable
diseases, and achieve systems-wide improvements in ac-
cess and financing, among others [79].
The SDG goals and targets also include a commitment
to improve governance. Strong institutions and good
governance are essential to ensuring equitable access to
quality public services, including health and education
[80]. With the SDGs, we can expect to see more
resources dedicated to strengthening institutions and
building capacity to improve governance. This is an im-
portant opportunity to invest in health systems strength-
ening to prevent and control corruption.
SDG 16 (“Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies”)
specifically includes a sub-target to “substantially reduce
corruption and bribery in all their forms”. The UN Inter-
Agency Expert Group on SDG Indicators proposes to
measure this target by the ‘percentage of persons who had
at least one contact with a public official, who paid a bribe
to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by these public
officials, in the previous 12 months, disaggregated by age
group, sex, region and population group’ [81].
While a single target cannot capture the myriad forms
of corruption, the health sector provides many oppor-
tunities for bribes or informal payments, especially
within the procurement process, during health inspec-
tions, and in interactions between individuals and clini-
cians. For example, over 30 % of respondents from eight
African countries reported having to pay bribes to access
healthcare services in one study, with the poorest being
most disadvantaged [82]. A review of audit reports for
health grants in Brazil found that 55.9 % of municipal-
ities had experienced at least one incident of corruption,
including procurement fraud and over-invoicing [83].
Looking forward, health sector leaders should be setting
their own intermediate targets to reduce opportunities
and incentives for bribes and informal payments in order
to achieve the SDGs.
Fig. 10 Taryn Vian is Associate Chair of Education and Associate
Professor of Global Health at the Boston University School of Public
Health. Her research and teaching focus on corruption and health,
good governance, financial reforms, and management systems. She
has analyzed corruption vulnerabilities in various countries for clients
including USAID, Transparency International, the Council of Europe,
and WHO. She has participated in Global Advisory Groups and expert
meetings organized by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, USAID,
UNDESA, and WHO on public engagement in anti-corruption,
transparency in the pharmaceutical sector, and supply management
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Some strategies are known to work. Informal pay-
ments can be reduced by making sure patients are aware
of official pricing policies, implementing payment sys-
tems reforms, and improving incentives of healthcare
professionals to provide good quality care so that pa-
tients do not need to resort to bribes [84, 85]. Bribes in
procurement can be controlled through price monitor-
ing to detect and investigate procurements which may
have inflated prices to conceal bribes, through electronic
procurement systems which control discretion and in-
crease transparency, and by regular internal and external
audits [86, 87]. Community monitoring for account-
ability has proven effective in reducing medicine stock-
outs, unjustified absenteeism, informal payments, and
other forms of abuse of power [88]. These strategies
need to be adapted to context, paying attention to local
knowledge and building on local values that are compat-
ible with improved integrity and better governance.
Researchers studying health sector corruption in
Europe developed a typology of six common corruption
problems, including bribery in medical service delivery,
procurement corruption, improper medical device and
medicines marketing relations, misuse of (high) level posi-
tions, undue reimbursement claims, and fraud and
embezzlement of medicines and medical devices [89]. Yet,
the prevalence and patterns of these problems vary by
country. Reflecting these differences, priority-setting for
anti-corruption depends, in part, on the financing system
in place – corruption risks in tax-based systems generally
include diversion of funds at the ministerial level, informal
payments, corruption in procurement, and abuses affect-
ing quality of care, while in social insurance systems there
are higher risks for corruption due to excessive treatment,
billing fraud, and diversion of funds [89].
Analyzing risks in particular settings is important, and
can draw on analysis of household budget survey data
(to detect informal payments), medicine price surveys
(to detect excessive payments for commodities which
might indicate bribery or bid-rigging), past audit reports
(to detect gaps in financial controls), and interviews with
key informants (to identify areas where excess discretion
or other systems weaknesses may lead to abuses) [90–92].
The effectiveness of interventions will depend as much on
a country’s culture, history, institutional constraints, and
capacities as it does on analysis of forms of corruption.
Attempting to apply standardized solutions without
concern for the particular corruption problem in its own
context is counterproductive.
We can strengthen governance in the health sector, and
this will help countries to achieve the SDGs. Monitoring
bribery (the target for SDG 16) through health sector sur-
veys will help focus attention on the problem, but it is not
a solution. We need to train a new generation of health
leaders who can diagnose health sector corruption risks
and incorporate solutions into health policies and plans.
Unaddressed corruption directly impacts attainment of
the SDG health goals, and cannot be accepted.
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